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litigated. The predecessors to the Code had excluded gifts from income 
since the inception of the income tax in 1913.12 
The District Court's decision that gifts were not income under the 
16th Amendment was consistent with the restricted definition of income 
then utilized by the Supreme Court. Earlier, in 1920, the Court in Eis-
ner v. Macomber13 had narrowly defined income as payments received 
by a taxpayer for services or the use or sale of her capital. Another 
Supreme Court decision, Edwards v. Cuba R. Co.,14 had determined in 
1925 that payments received by a corporation from the Cuban govern-
ment to subsidize construction of a railroad in Cuba were not income 
under the 16th Amendment because the payments "were not made for 
services rendered or to be rendered"15 and "were not profits or gains 
from the use or operation of [the taxpayer's capital, i.e.,] the railroad 
.•.• " 16 Instead, the Court characterized the payments as non-taxable 
contributions to capital. Similar reasoning might have excluded gifts to 
individuals from income for purposes of the 16th Amendment since the 
receipt of a gift would not be for services or the use or sale of capital.17 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District 
Court in a decision that involved three separate opinions by the three-
member panel.18 Chief Judge Manton wrote that taxing Elizabeth on all 
appreciation that had accrued from the date that her father had ac-
quired the stock did not violate the 5th or 16th Amendments.19 He rea-
soned that Congress had a valid purpose, minimizing tax avoidance by 
imposing a carryover basis, and that the Elizabeth had full knowledge 
that the carryover basis would apply.20 In addition, he observed that the 
amount of income that was taxed was not any greater than the amount 
that would have been taxed had Elizabeth's father sold the stock.21 
Judge Hand concurred in a separate opinion. He said that the 16th 
Amendment was not violated because the gain taxed clearly represented 
12 MAGILL, supra note 2, at 357. 
13 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). 
14 268 U.S. 628 (1925). 
15 Id. at 633. 
16 Id. 
17 For excellent discussions of the evolution of the definition of income, see 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got To Do 
With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869 (1985); Majorie E. Korhnauser, The Constitutional Meaning of 
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1992). Professor Korn-
hauser notes that there is some evidence that the term "income" as used in the 16th 
Amendment was not intended to include gifts, although the matter is far from clear. 
18 Bowers v. Taft, 20 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 1927). 
19 Id. at 563. 
20 Id. at 562-63. 
2 1 Id. at 563. 
26 ACTEC LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:23 
appreciation that had occurred after the donor purchased the stock.22 
He further reasoned that the 16th Amendment did not require that in-
come subject to tax be the income of the actual taxpayer, stating that 
"[t]he language of the Amendment itself gives Congress power to lay 
'taxes on incomes,' not on persons."23 
Judge Swan dissented, citing Edwards v. Cuba R. Co. 24 He argued 
that property "obtained by gift is capital, not income in the hands of the 
donee upon its receipt. "25 He concluded that taxing gain that had ac-
crued while Elizabeth's father had held the stock was the same as taxing 
a portion of the capital that Elizabeth had received as a gift.26 
The Supreme Court (with Chief Justice Taft recusing himself) unan~ 
imously affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.27 The 
Court noted that without a carryover basis, the appreciation that had 
occurred prior to the gift would forever escape taxation.28 Moreover, 
the Court determined, the imposition of a tax on the taxpayer did not 
impose a hardship.29 The Court stated: 
In truth the stock represented only a single investment of capi-
tal - that made by the donor. And when through sale or con-
version the increase was separated therefrom, it became 
income from that investment in the hands of the recipient ... 
according to the very words of the Sixteenth Amendment. By 
requiring the recipient of the entire increase to pay a part into 
the public treasury, Congress deprived her of no right and sub-
jected her to no hardship. She accepted the gift with knowl-
edge of the statute and, as to the property received, voluntarily 
assumed the position of her donor. When she sold the stock 
she actually got the original sum invested, plus the entire ap-
preciation . . . . 30 
Adopting the reasoning of Judge Hand in the Court of Appeals deci-
sion, the Court succinctly concluded: 
There is nothing in the Constitution which lends support to the 
theory that gain actually resulting from the increased value of 
capital can be treated as taxable income in the hands of the 
22 Id. at 564. 
23 Id. 
2 4 Id. at 565. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 484 (1929). 
28 Id. at 482-83. 
29 Id. at 482. 
30 Id. 
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recipient only so far as the increase occurred while he owned 
the property.31 
27 
The significance of the holding in Taft cannot be overstated. By 
holding that gain taxed to the taxpayer need not be the gain that had 
accrued while the taxpayer held the asset, the Court confirmed that non-
recognition provisions may defer the recognition of income. The result 
is that gain avoided by a transferee in such non-recognition transactions 
as corporate reorganizations, like-kind exch~nges and gifts, may be 
taxed at a future date when the transferee disposes of the property in a 
taxable transaction. 
The case is also important because it represents an important step 
in the Court's evolution towards an expansive definition of income. 
Early Court decisions suggested a narrow approach to the definition of 
income with only amounts received by the taxpayer for her services or 
the use or sale of her capital qualifying as income. By holding that taxa-
ble gains need not have accrued while the current taxpayer held the 
property, the Court started to shift focus away from the taxpayer's activ-
ity in generating income to whether the taxpayer had simply exper-
ienced an accession to wealth. This movement to a broad concept of 
income stands in stark contrast to the narrow approach the Court pur-
sued in defining the tax base of the estate tax. Early Supreme Court 
decisions on the estate tax, such as Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co.,32 established that the estate tax base, the "gross estate" as defined 
in section 2033 of the Code, was to be defined narrowly. The result is 
that in the estate tax, Congress was subsequently always playing "catch 
up," expanding the scope of the gross estate by adopting or amending 
sections 2034 to 2044 of the Code to deal with new estate planning 
abuses.33 In contrast, there has been little need to expand the concept 
of income in the income tax and, indeed, sections 71 to 138 of the Code 
generally limit the expansiveness of income as interpreted by the courts. 
31 Id. at 484. 
32 316 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1942). 
33 PAUL R. McDANIEL, JAMES R. REPETTI & PAULL. CARON, FEDERAL WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAXATION 108 (7th ed. 2015). 
